Regional allies on the spot as U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan ramp up

SEOUL, South Korea — If and when Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, now visiting Guatemala, defies Chinese warnings and meets Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, defense will almost certainly be on the agenda.

Asia’s nightmare scenario is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But as all sides game-plan for a possible shooting war, U.S. troops may find themselves fighting a lonely battle as allies across the region calibrate their response.

President Joe Biden has stated unequivocally that America will fight for Taiwan, but — unlike the role NATO plays in Europe — no formal defense alliance exists to determine who fights and who stays on the sidelines.

The four regional allies which have mutual defense treaties with the U.S. and which host GIs – Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines — are not formally linked to one another. Moreover, China is the biggest trade partner to all four, making defense rhetorical coordination, let alone real-world military policies, difficult to predict.

China’s state-controlled press routinely condemns its East Asian neighbors for allowing themselves to be “bullied” by Washington into the drive to contain Beijing in the region, warning that they will suffer if they do not stand up to U.S. pressure.

The result: Although the Trump and Biden administrations have actively tried to strengthen and deepen ties with countries across the Indo-Pacific to contain China, no one in Washington or Beijing can say with full certainty what the array of forces would be in a war over Taiwan, a war that many fear could be just a few years away.

Reluctant samurai

In any clash over Taiwan, Japan is particularly critical.

Its Ryukyu Islands encompass the Mikayo Strait — a key channel for Chinese warships into the open Pacific, which they would need to reach to blockade Taiwan. Tokyo is currently building bases on islands that dominate the strait.

More “first to fight” U.S. assets — naval, air force and marine — are based in Japan than anywhere else in Asia. Tokyo’s Self Defense Force, or SDF, boasts powerful maritime capabilities, and the political consensus to move beyond Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution has firmed up.

“Japan probably will [fight] — as long as the Americans move to defend Taiwan,” said Grant Newsham, a retired U.S. Marine colonel and diplomat with wide experience of Japan and Taiwan. “Japan really would have no choice.”

That decision hinges upon two factors.

First, if Japan-based U.S. forces came to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a military invasion, such as firing artillery or missiles from the Southern Ryukyus, China might return fire upon Japan. Second. a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be a strategic nightmare for Japanese defense planners, giving Beijing’s fleet port access to the open Pacific and undercutting Japan’s own defenses.

“Taiwan’s defense is also Japan’s defense — something Japan’s ruling class finally recognizes,” Mr. Newsham said. “The SDF has been saying this for years.”

Japan and Taiwan enjoy warm ties, dating back to an unusually amicable colonial experience from 1895 to the end of World War II. Tokyo has become more bullish, following tweaks to its pacifist constitution in 2014, enabling “collective defense” and a major increase in military spending. New assets — marines, F-35 light carriers and, most recently, cruise missiles — are beefing up the national armory.

“Things have come remarkably far in the past few years … especially in efforts to realign Japan’s defense strategy and policy, making public statements and moving the bureaucracy along,” said Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute. “The question is to what extent this is at the operational planning level.”

If joint Japan-U.S. planning is underway, it is secret. If not, “one expects Japan’s contribution to be haphazard and ad hoc — to an uncomfortable degree,” said Mr. Newsham.

Broadly, experts see U.S. forces battling Chinese forces in open combat, while Japanese troops and ships protect bases and offer logistic support.

“I am sure the government is prepared to give rear-end support, but taking part in actual combat — I doubt it,” said Haruko Satoh, an international relations expert at the Osaka School of International Public Policy. Japan, he said, would not fight directly “unless our territory is threatened.”

Though war talk in Japanese media has risen, public opinion has been much more reticent, aside from anti-base protests in Okinawa and the Southern Ryukyus. Many see the rising alarmism and harsh rhetoric from both parties in Washington about China as a source for concern.

“Most Japanese are as apprehensive about the U.S. as they are about China,” said Ms. Satoh.

Australia: Committed but distant

Unlike Japan, Australia does not control strategic choke points or offer bases and access close to Taiwan. But multiple facts argue for Canberra siding with Washington in a fight over Taiwan.

The Australia-U.S. alliance was reinforced by 2021’s trilateral “AUKUS” initiative, under which Britain and the U.S. offered Australia nuclear submarine technology. Another factor is Canberra’s poor relations with Beijing.

“At the political level, [Australians] are forward-leaning and aligning with the U.S. on Taiwan,” said Mr. Hsiao. “It would be inconceivable if there was a Taiwan contingency and Australia stayed out.”

“Australia would do whatever it can to support the U.S.,” agreed Jeffrey Robertson, an Australian expert on Asia relations with Seoul’s Yonsei University. “It has a role to play — but not a significant one.”

Alex Neill, a Singapore-based defense expert with the Pacific Forum, said that “perhaps the most synergistic relationship” in the region is between Australian troops and U.S. Marines, who rotate in annually, while Canberra’s special forces, surface fleet and maritime patrol aircraft could prove valuable in region-wide clash with China. But analysts also note that Australia’s professional troops number just 60,000.

And with the moderate administration of new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese having taken over from the more hawkish, anti-Chinese Scott Morrison government in 2022, the severity of China’s threat is once again a subject of hot political debate.

Mr. Albanese has said he is open to a visit to Beijing and has spoken repeatedly of the importance of Chinese markets for Australia’s economy.

“I think it’s been a good thing that the [Australian-Chinese] relationship has got more stable,” Mr Albanese told the Australian Financial Review Business Summit last month. “We want a more stable, secure region. And I’ve said we will cooperate with China where we can, we’ll disagree where we must, but we’ll engage in our national interest.”

Said Mr. Neill, “Front-line capabilities have become a political football in Canberra and there is reticence against being pulled in. It’s a hot topic, linking to Australian self-determination vis-a-vis the U.S.”

Korean priorities

In a hypothetical Taiwan war, South Korea, home to a powerful military, is ideally placed: It overlooks China across the Yellow Sea and possesses a strategically sited naval base on Jeju Island. Moreover, thousands of American troops in American bases line its Yellow Sea coast.

But Seoul has minimal appetite to fight for Taiwan. “I doubt [South Korea] would be there,” said Mr. Robertson. “I don’t think they would want any role whatsoever.”

Rancor lingers in Taipei over Seoul’s abrupt severance of diplomatic ties, in favor of Beijing, in 1992 and though South Koreans are wary of China, there is little sense of democratic comradeship with Taiwan.

“There were mentions of Taiwan when Biden met [South Korean Presidents Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk Yeol], which was quite remarkable,” said Mr. Hsiao. “But South Korea has been very hesitant to have discussions with Taiwan.”

During his decades-long career, retired senior South Korean Gen. Chun In-bum said he never trained to defend Taiwan. South Korean assistance to the U.S. in a contingency would likely be “repair facilities and hospitals on the peninsula, or refueling assets in the air or at sea,” Mr. Chun reckoned.

Only if U.S. bases inside South Korea were hit by China would Seoul fight, Mr. Chun said. Even then, key assets would remain facing not China but North Korea — for if conflict engulfed Taiwan, the fear in Seoul is that Pyongyang could leverage the chaos to attack.

“That is a serious risk,” said Mr. Chun. “It would not be easy for us to divert forces to the Taiwanese theater of operations.”

Philippines: Close but underpowered

Like Japan, the Philippines is geographically well-sited for Taiwan’s defense. Its northern island commands the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan, a channel for Chinese fleets into blue-water Pacific.

“I think the U.S. wants as much geographical access as possible, and exploiting alliance relationships is a natural consequence of that,” said Mr. Neill. “‘Bases and places’ is a key aim of Indo-Pacific Command in terms of logistics, supply and power projection, and the Philippines is very much part of that.”

In February, Manila agreed to expand rotational basing sites in the archipelago available to U.S. troops and just in recent days, the government of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has risked Beijing’s wrath by naming sites notable close to Taiwan.

The Associated Press reported Monday that the Marcos government had identified four new military camps, including two just across the sea from Taiwan, where rotating batches of American forces will be allowed to be stationed indefinitely, saying it would boost the country’s coastline defenses.

The new sites include a Philippine navy base in Santa Ana and an international airport in Lal-lo, both in northern Cagayan province — a potential staging ground for U.S. troops close to southern China and Taiwan, the Associated Press reported.

The Pentagon said in a statement that the new locations “will strengthen the interoperability of the U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces and allow us to respond more seamlessly together to address a range of shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.”

The move has infuriated Beijing, which has been engaged in a long pressure campaign with Manila over dispute sovereignty claims in the contested South China Sea.

The Chinese Embassy also warned in a recent statement that the push by the Marcos government to move closer to the U.S. “will drag the Philippines into the abyss of geopolitical strife and damage its economic development at the end of the day.”

The bases will be helpful, but Philippine forces less so in a war, argues Mr. Neill: “Local forces are underfunded and focused on counterinsurgency, not high-tech, big war. What the defense forces of the Philippines could actually contribute is limited.”